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REGULATION LLC
I. INTRODUCTION
 In enacting the federal securities laws,1 Congress, through registration, disclosure, 
and anti-fraud provisions, sought to protect investors in “securities” as the term is 
defined in section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”).2 Over the 
last eighty years, courts have grappled with the term “security” by developing a 
variety of standards and frameworks to determine whether investments in anything 
ranging from stock to general partnerships constitute securities and are therefore 
subject to the requirements of the federal securities laws. This, however, has resulted 
in uncertain and inconsistent determinations for the financial interests in a Limited 
Liability Company (LLC), a modern favored choice of business entity.
 Much of the analysis regarding what constitutes a security has stemmed from the 
umbrella term “investment contract” under which many financial investments may 
fall, and, specifically, the “investment contract” formulation developed by the 
Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.3 In that case, 
the Court determined that an investment in a “common enterprise” with profits to be 
derived “solely” through the efforts of others will be an investment contract and 
ultimately a security under the federal securities laws. Generally, courts employ the 
Howey test as the doctrinal starting point in determining whether a given financial 
instrument or interest, not explicitly mentioned in section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, is 
a security. As the Supreme Court opined in Howey, the investment contract analysis 
“embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to 
meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the 
money of others on the promise of profits.”4
 Over the last two decades, courts have applied the Howey investment contract 
analysis in determining whether LLC membership interests fall within the definition 
of a security and, in turn, are subject to the federal securities laws.5 “LLCs are hybrid 
entities that combine desirable characteristics of corporations, limited partnerships, 
and general partnerships.”6 By offering many of the favorable features of both general 
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2006) (the 1933 Act provisions and protections focus on the offering and sale 
of securities); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–pp (2006) (the 1934 Act provides protection to investors once the 
securities are in the marketplace).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (Supp. 2010). In the enacting/introductory language of the 1933 Act, Congress 
stated its purpose was “[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate 
and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other 
purposes.” Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
3. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
4. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
5. See discussion, infra Part IV (examining a series of federal cases that have addressed this issue). This note’s 
analysis focuses on the term security as defined in section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act only. However, as the 
Supreme Court noted in Tcherepnin v. Knight, the definitions of the term “security” in the 1933 Act and 
the 1934 Act, although semantically different, are “virtually identical.” 389 U.S. 332, 335–36 (1967).
6. Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 383 (D. Del. 2000); see also 1 Larry 
E. Ribstein & Robert R. Keatinge, Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies § 
1:2 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Ribstein & Keatinge].
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partnerships and corporations,7 the LLC’s hybrid nature and flexibility have led it to 
become a popular and attractive business form.8 It is uncertain, however, whether an 
LLC membership interest sold to investors as a means of financing LLCs is a security 
under section 2(a)(1) and therefore subject to federal securities law regulation.9 
Securities regulation involves significant registration and disclosure requirements, and, 
as a result, increased compliance and transaction costs for the LLC issuer,10 while 
offering both potential and actual investors disclosure and anti-fraud protection.11 
These rights and responsibilities of both the LLC issuer and the LLC investor are too 
important to be left to inconsistent and uncertain judicial interpretations.
 While taking the position that the characteristics of each LLC membership 
interest will dictate whether it is in fact a security,12 this note proposes that the 
[A]n LLC may be generally defined as an unincorporated entity that is formed or 
organized through a filing with the state under a state limited liability company statute, 
the members and managers of which do not have vicarious liability for the obligations 
of the entity, and the relationship of the members, managers and the entity is largely 
governed by an agreement among them or, where the parties have not agreed to the 
contrary, by the default rules of the state statute.
 Id. § 1:3.
7. See infra Part III (discussing the LLC as a business entity and making comparisons between an LLC, 
general partnership, and corporation). Some of these favorable features include individual as opposed to 
“double taxation” or entity level taxation, limited liability for the debts and liabilities of LLC members, 
as well as f lexibility in establishing an internal governance structure. Id.
8. See 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 1:1.
Over the past several years, this form of organization has evolved as statutory drafting 
groups, legislatures, state and federal tax officials, judges and, most importantly, the 
business people themselves who are using and dealing with LLCs, have thought 
through the issues. Thus, the nation’s leading business court, the Delaware Supreme 
Court, has endorsed the LLC as a relatively new entity that has emerged in recent years 
as an attractive vehicle to facilitate business relationships and transactions.
 Id.
9. See Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 1069, 1071 
(1992).
The LLC raises fascinating questions on several levels. It introduces new complications 
into the traditional choice of business form analysis. . . . The question is obviously of 
great practical importance. If limited liability interests are securities, they cannot be 
offered or sold without registration or exemption therefrom under the securities laws. 
In addition, their status as securities would trigger substantial disclosure obligations 
and create the risk of liability under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
 Id.
10. See Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company Membership Interests Should Not be Treated as 
Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage this Result, 45 Hastings L.J. 1223, 1285 (1994) (“The real 
problem is that the cost of federal regulation can be tremendous.”).
11. Id. at 1279–85.
12. See Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 174–75 (4th Cir. 2003).
Precisely because LLCs lack standardized membership rights or organizational structures, they 
can assume an almost unlimited variety of forms. It becomes, then, exceedingly difficult to 
declare that LLCs, whatever their form, either possess or lack the economic characteristics 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgate a regulatory safe harbor, 
“Regulation LLC” (“Reg. LLC”), that would set forth the conditions under which 
an LLC membership interest would not be deemed a security for purposes of the 
federal securities law.13 Reg. LLC would thereby provide business managers and 
business advisors certainty in forming an LLC and issuing LLC interests to investors 
with respect to whether the LLC membership interests are securities.
 Part II of this note will discuss the structure of section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act as 
it defines the term “security.” Further, this Part will briefly discuss how courts have 
interpreted certain terms found in this section and specifically address the term 
“investment contract.” Part III will address the LLC from its inception over thirty 
years ago in Wyoming to the present, making comparisons between the LLC, the 
general partnership, and the corporation to set the background for why courts, 
business managers, and legal advisors have struggled in answering the question of 
whether an LLC membership interest is a security.
 Part IV will begin with a discussion of relevant federal case law in an attempt to 
decipher the principles that should comprise the analytical framework for Reg. LLC. 
Part V will discuss and evaluate scholarly commentary and potential solutions to 
associated with investment contracts. Even drawing firm lines between member-managed 
and manager-managed LLCs threatens impermissibly to elevate form over substance. 
Certainly the members in a member-managed LLC will often have powers too significant 
to be considered passive investors under the securities laws. And yet even members in a 
member-managed LLC may be unable as a practical matter to exercise any meaningful 
control, perhaps because they are too numerous, inexperienced, or geographically 
disparate. By the same token, while interests in manager-managed LLCs may often be 
securities, their members need not necessarily be reliant on the efforts on their managers. 
We decline, therefore, the parties’ invitation for a broader holding.
 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
13. The Securities and Exchange Commission was created by section 4 of the 1934 Act. Specifically, 
section 23 of the 1934 Act provides the scope of the SEC’s authority.
The Commission . . . shall each have power to make such rules and regulations as may 
be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter for which they 
are responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in them by this chapter, and 
may for such purposes classify persons, securities, transactions, statements, applications, 
reports, and other matters within their respective jurisdictions, and prescribe greater, 
lesser, or different requirements for different classes thereof.
 15 U.S.C. § 78w (2006).
 As defined by Professor Hazen,
[a] safe harbor rule sets forth conditions under which the SEC will take the position 
that the law has been complied with. A person’s compliance with a safe harbor rule will 
thus assure that he or she is safe from SEC prosecution with regard to the transaction 
in question. The SEC safe harbor rules are designed to help provide for certainty in 
planning transactions in order to comply with the applicable securities laws.
 Thomas Lee Hazen, Principles of Securities Regulation 24 (3d ed. 2009). An example of a SEC 
safe harbor is Regulation D. Regulation D provides registration exemptions for small issuances of 
securities and small issuers of securities, provided certain conditions are met. See Rules Governing the 
Limited Sale of Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R §§ 
230.501–.508 (2011).
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addressing the question of whether LLC membership interests are securities. Finally, 
Part VI will present the framework of Reg. LLC. It is envisaged that Reg. LLC will 
provide business managers and legal advisors, who in good faith have structured an 
LLC without the intent to improperly circumvent federal securities laws, a safe 
harbor for LLC membership interests exempting them from federal securities laws. 
The benefit of a safe harbor is that it will provide a level of certainty in the planning 
phase as opposed to the current regime under which a court may impose liability for 
violations of the federal securities laws with respect to the purchase or sale of LLC 
membership interests.14
II.  THE STATUTORY STRUCTURE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 
???????
 A. The Structure of Section 2(a)(1)
 In response to the Great Depression and the stock market crash of October 1929, 
Congress passed the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 
Act”) “[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in 
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the 
sale thereof.”15 As such, “[t]he federal securities laws apply to any investment 
described by the broad definition of a ‘security’ unless an exemption applies.”16 
Specifically, section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act defines a security as follows:
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certif icate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment 
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, 
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of 
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any 
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities 
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a “security,” or any certificate of interest or participation 
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or 
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.17
The term security is defined in both specific and general terms, including specific 
terms such as “stock” or “bond,” which each have commonly understood meanings, 
but also with general terms such as “investment contract” or “any interest or 
14. Larry E. Ribstein, Form and Substance in the Definition of a “Security”: The Case of Limited Liability 
Companies, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 807, 828 (1994) (“An ‘economic reality’-type approach may impose 
significant costs by requiring an adjudicator to make a difficult act-specific inquiry in each case about 
the need for disclosure”).
15. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
16. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 808.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006). 
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instrument commonly known as a ‘security,’” which over the years have required a 
judicial case-by-case interpretation to determine if a given financial instrument is a 
security.18 Also, by including both general and specific terms, it is apparent that 
Congress did not intend all investments to be a security, giving courts great f lexibility 
to determine what financial instruments or schemes fit within the statutory 
definition.19
 One of the first cases to interpret the term security was Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., in which the Supreme Court reversed the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determination that oil lease assignments 
fell outside the scope of section 2(a)(1) and were therefore not securities.20 The Court 
provided some guidance on how broadly the term security should be read:
In the Securities Act the term “security” was defined to include by name or 
description many documents in which there is common trading for speculation 
or investment. . . . Instruments may be included within any of these 
definitions, as a matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or 
description. However, the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious 
and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear 
to be, are also reached if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered 
or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their character in 
commerce as “ investment contracts,” or as “any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a ‘security.’”21
Early on, the Court recognized that many investments, unknown at the time of the 
passage of the securities laws, may fit within this definition of a security.
18. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Regulation 254 (11th ed. 2009).
The purpose of the two-part test was to include within the definition the many types of 
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.
. . . .
Both the specific and general definitions in the Securities Acts are said to apply unless 
the context otherwise requires.
 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, even if a given financial instrument 
appears to fall within one of the specific, enumerated categories of what Congress has termed a 
“security,” the circumstances may not require the instrument to be registered with the SEC. Examples 
of those not requiring registration include Regulation A (a small offerings exemption), Regulation D 
(accredited investor exemption), and Regulation S (foreign issuances). See Conditional Small Issues 
Exemption, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2011); Rules Governing the Limited Sale of Securities 
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R §§ 230.501–.508 (2011); Rules 
Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside the United States Without Registration Under the Securities 
Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R §§ 230.901–.905 (2011).
19. See Robert R. Joseph, Comment, Should Interests in Limited Liability Companies Be Deemed Securities?: 
The Resurgence of Economic Reality in Investment Contract Analysis, 44 Emory L.J. 1591, 1600 nn.39–40 
(1995).
20. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
21. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
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 B. Federal Courts’ Interpretation of Security
 Section 2(a)(1)’s broad definition of the term security has provided courts great 
latitude in determining what financial instruments constitute a security and fall 
within the coverage of the federal securities laws.22 The focus of the discussion below 
is on the term “investment contract”23 because the Supreme Court’s investment 
contract analysis in Howey has withstood the test of time as the starting point for 
federal courts addressing the issue of whether LLC membership interests are 
securities.24 Although courts have elaborated on the Howey test over the years,25 it 
remains the bedrock principle to guide the analysis of what constitutes a security.26
 At dispute in Howey was whether a citrus grove development contract offered to 
many potential investors constituted an “investment contract” and therefore a security 
under section 2(a)(1).27 The substance of the Court’s interpretation of “investment 
contract” that has been in effect for the last sixty-six years was stated as follows:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, 
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common 
22. See Joseph, supra note 19, at 1599–1600 (“This ‘open-textured’ definition makes it clear that from the 
very beginning the securities laws were intended to apply wherever they were needed, and that the task 
of determining the scope of the acts, at least at the margins, would be left to the judiciary.” (footnotes 
omitted)).
23. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
24. See, e.g., Keith v. Black Diamond Advisors, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 326, 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“LLC 
membership interests are not ‘securities’ unless they meet the four criteria of an ‘investment contract.’”).
25. In a discussion of how to interpret the term “solely” in the fourth prong of the Howey test, the Fifth 
Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit approach, stating, “the proper standard in determining whether a 
scheme constitutes an investment contract is . . . whether the efforts made by those other than the 
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure 
or success of the enterprise.” SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(quoting SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006). Other general terms found within the definition of a “security” include 
“instrument commonly known as a security” and a “certificate of interest or participation in any profit 
sharing agreement.” Id. However, with respect to the phrase “instrument commonly known as a 
security,” the Supreme Court has stated:
[w]e perceive no distinction, for present purposes, between an “investment contract” 
and an “instrument commonly known as a ‘security.’” In either case, the basic test for 
distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings is “whether the scheme 
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely 
from the efforts of others.”
 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851–52 (1975) (citation omitted). Although the 
Supreme Court in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), did not address whether 
“certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement” has any broader meaning under 
the 1933 Act than an “investment contract,” the Court stated that the Howey test “embodies the 
essential attributes that run through all of the Court’s decisions defining a security.” Id. at n.11 (quoting 
Forman, 421 U.S. at 852). As a result, for present purposes at least, the Howey investment contract 
analysis is the standard for defining a general term found in the definition of a security. See id.
27. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 294 (“an offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract 
for cultivating, marketing and remitting the net proceeds to the investor”).
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enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or 
a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are 
evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets 
employed in the enterprise.28
This definition of an investment contract originated under state law as the states 
attempted to formulate definitions for the term “investment contract” under their 
respective “Blue Sky” laws.29 In accepting the state law formulation, the Supreme 
Court believed that it was “permit[ting] the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of 
compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of 
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a 
security.’”30
 The Howey test is understood to have four factors: (1) that an investor provide 
“some tangible and definable consideration,” (2) for an investment in a “common 
enterprise,” (3) with “an expectation of profit by the investor[,] and (4) that the 
expectation of profit be derived from the entrepreneurial efforts of others.”31 In 
applying this test, the Supreme Court has clarified that the substance of the given 
financial investment should govern the analysis and not merely the name of the 
underlying instrument.32 In a discussion of the Howey factors, Professor Ribstein 
contends that the factors are best understood “in terms of the economic rationales for 
mandatory federal disclosure.”33
 The first factor, “tangible and definable consideration,” has been deemed to 
include money, property, or in some instances sweat equity.34 With respect to the 
28. Id. at 298–99 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 298 (“[T]he term [investment contract] was common in many state ‘blue sky’ laws in existence 
prior to the adoption of the federal statute and, although the term was also undefined by the state laws, 
it had been broadly construed by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure of 
protection.”). “Blue sky laws” is the colloquial term for the securities laws of an individual state. These 
laws were in effect in many states prior to the enactment of the federal securities laws. In discussing the 
origins of the term “blue sky,” Professor Hazen writes, “[t]here are a number of explanations for the 
derivation of the ‘blue sky’ appellation, the most common of which was because of the Kansas statute’s 
[the first state to develop a securities law regime] purpose to protect the Kansas farmers against the 
industrialists selling them a piece of the blue sky.” See Hazen, supra note 13, at 14.
30. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-85, at 11 (1933)). Further, the Court opined that the 
investment contract analysis “embodies a f lexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of 
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money 
of others on the promise of profits.” Id.
31. Keith v. Black Diamond Advisors, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 326, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
32. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 811 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)). See SEC v. 
Shreveport Wireless Cable Television P’ship, No. 94-1781 (HHG), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086, at 
*11 (D.D.C. 1998) (“In determining whether a particular interest or investment constitutes an 
‘investment contract,’ a court’s focus is on the ‘economic realities of the underlying transaction and not on 
the name it carries.’” (emphasis added) (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 
849 (1975))).
33. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 811.
34. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 29 (“Subsequent case law has taken the position that the investment of 
services or property, as opposed to money, can also suffice.”); see also United Hous. Found., Inc., 421 U.S. 
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second element of Howey, the “common interest” or “common enterprise” prong, 
courts have not been entirely clear about what constitutes a “common enterprise.” 
However, it is generally understood that “[t]he common enterprise requirement 
focuses on the question of the extent to which the success of the investor’s interest 
rises and falls with others involved in the enterprise.”35 To interpret this second 
prong, courts have developed two concepts: horizontal commonality and vertical 
commonality.36 Courts have found that horizontal commonality exists where multiple 
investments by different investors are pooled together by a promoter in the same 
enterprise. Under the court’s interpretation of vertical commonality, an individual 
investor and the enterprise promoter’s funds are pooled together.37 Horizontal 
commonality clearly meets the Howey standard for a common enterprise because 
each investor’s potential for profitability is linked with those of other investors within 
the same enterprise whereas courts are split on whether vertical commonality meets 
the common enterprise element of the Howey test because the investor is simply 
linked with the promoter and is not involved in a common enterprise with other 
investors.38 The Supreme Court has found the third requirement, “expectation of 
profit,” to be satisfied by a sharing in the profits and proceeds of the business entity39 
which includes the “promise of a fixed income stream.”40
 The fourth and final element of Howey, “profits solely from the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party,”41 as discussed below, is the element primarily at issue in the 
LLC context. It has subsequently been interpreted by courts to mean that expected 
profits are to be “derived primarily or substantially from the efforts of others.”42 Under 
this reading, profits no longer need to be derived solely from the efforts of others, as the 
Howey court initially articulated. The level of control and discretion exercised by the 
individual investor plays a crucial role in determining whether an investment contract, 
at 852 n.16.
35. Hazen, supra note 13, at 30.
36. See id.
37. Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 389–90 (D. Del. 2000).
To determine whether a party has invested funds in a common enterprise, courts look 
to whether there is horizontal commonality between investors, or vertical commonality 
between a promoter and an investor. Horizontal commonality requires a pooling of 
investors’ contributions and distribution of profits and losses on a pro-rata basis among 
investors. The vertical commonality test is less stringent, and requires that an investor 
and promoter be engaged in a common enterprise, with the “fortunes of the investors 
linked with those of the promoters.”
 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 30.
39. See United Hous. Found., Inc., 421 U.S. at 837; Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
40. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 30 (citing SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004)).
41. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
42. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 31 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and thus a security, exists.43 As a result, the key question that must be satisfied to 
determine the existence of a security is “whether the efforts made by those other than 
the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts 
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”44 As the cases discussed below 
indicate, this last element is particularly important in determining whether the LLC 
membership interests are securities.
III. THE HYBRID LLC
 A. The Limited Liability Company
 The first Limited Liability Company statute was enacted in Wyoming in 1977.45 
While states began to enact their own versions of LLC statutes,46 it was not until 
over a decade later, when the tax code was rewritten to allow LLCs to be taxed as a 
partnership instead of as a corporation, that the LLC became a popular choice of 
entity for business managers.47 LLCs are a popular choice of entity because they offer 
many of the advantageous or “desirable characteristics” of other entities, such as 
limited liability of members afforded by corporations as well as individual taxation, 
as opposed to entity-level tax treatment.48 The formation of an LLC requires an 
agreement and a filing with the Secretary of State, but there is great latitude in 
43. See discussion infra Part IV. 
44. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973); see also United Hous. Found., 
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (“The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common 
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or 
managerial efforts of others.”); Shirley v. JED Capital, 714 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (2010) (“The word 
‘solely’ should not be interpreted strictly, but rather realistically, and should turn on whether the actions 
of those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts 
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
45. See 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 1:2 (“The first limited liability company act was passed in 
Wyoming in 1977.”); see also Elaine A. Welle, Limited Liability Company Interests As Securities: An 
Analysis of Federal and State Actions Against Limited Liability Companies Under the Securities Laws, 73 
Denv. U. L. Rev. 425 (1996).
46. See 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 1:2 (“Florida adopted an LLC act in 1982. . . . Presumably 
as a result of the uncertainty as to both tax treatment and the members’ protection from personal 
liability, no other state enacted an LLC statute until 1990.”). Today, all states and the District of 
Columbia have their own LLC statutes. Id.
47. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to .7701-3 (2011); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(7)-2 (2011); see also 
Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 383 (D. Del. 2000) (“LLCs are entitled 
to partnership status for federal income tax purposes under certain circumstances, which permits LLC 
members to avoid double taxation, i.e., taxation of the entity as well as taxation of the members’ 
incomes.”); 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 1:2 (“After 1988, when the Service stated clearly 
that properly organized limited liability companies would be treated as partnerships, all of the remaining 
states adopted limited liability company statutes.”).
48. See Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 383; see also 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 1:2.
[A]n LLC may be generally defined as an unincorporated entity that is formed or 
organized through a filing with the state under a state limited liability company statute, 
the members and managers of which do not have vicarious liability for the obligations 
of the entity, and the relationship of the members, managers and the entity is largely 
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setting up the LLC’s internal structure.49 As part of this latitude, LLCs generally 
take one of two forms, as member-managed LLCs, which provide for management 
by the LLC members, or as manager-managed LLCs, which provide for management 
by others “who may or may not be members,” similar to a corporation.50 In both 
structures, a member has financial rights and, depending on what the Operating 
Agreement provides, “may also have governance rights.”51
 Through operation of statute, in terms of limited liability, an owner of an LLC is 
a member and all members have limited liability.52 This means that although 
members face the risk of losing their investment, creditors cannot go after the 
members’ personal assets.53 In addition, under the Revised Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (RULLCA), section 304(b),
[t]he failure of a[n] [LLC] to observe any particular formalities relating to the 
exercise of its powers or management of its activities is not a ground for 
imposing liability on the members or managers for the debts, obligations, or 
other liabilities of the company.54
governed by an agreement among them or, where the parties have not agreed to the 
contrary, by the default rules of the state statute.
 Id. § 1:3.
49. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporations and Other Business Organizations 494–95 (9th ed. 
2005); see also 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 2:1 (“The inherent f lexibility in most LLC 
statutes . . . enhances a firm’s ability to adopt features that best serve its objectives.”).
50. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 494; see 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 2:3.
[T]here are three fundamental structures: (1) the corporate structure (representative 
management) in which management is periodically elected by the owners; (2) the 
limited partnership structure (entrenched management) in which one or more persons 
are designated as managers at the outset and generally continue as managers unless 
removed for cause; and (3) the general partnership structure (direct management) in 
which the owners exercise management control directly.
 Id.
51. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 497.
52. See id. at 494; see also 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 2:7.
There are two types of liability that should be considered with respect to the liability 
structure of the firm. The first is vicarious individual liability of the owner for the 
obligations of the organization. This is the concern that a member or shareholder will 
be held personally liable for the debts of the LLC or corporation. The second liability 
concern is that the creditors of an owner may be able to reach the assets of an 
organization in which the debtor/owner has an interest. This is the concern of an owner 
of an organization that the creditors of some other owner may be able to disrupt the 
operation of the organization to satisfy the debts of the other owner.
 Id.
53. See Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 498. However, an exception to this rule may be if a court rules to pierce 
the corporate veil of the LLC and hold all or certain members personally liable. See, e.g., Kaycee Land 
& Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323 (Wyo. 2002).
54. Revised Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 304(b) (2006).
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 Under the model statute, section 304(b) provides great f lexibility for the internal 
structure and governance of an LLC, which may provide a significant advantage 
over the corporate form.55 Also, unless otherwise provided in the Operating 
Agreement, all members of an LLC are entitled to equally participate in management 
and control of the entity.56 Finally, a member of an LLC will have a financial stake 
and financial rights in the entity, and, depending on the internal governance structure 
provided in the Operating Agreement, a member may also have governance rights.57 
Generally, with respect to transferability, a member of an LLC can freely transfer 
the financial rights in the LLC, but statutes vary on how, if at all, the governance 
rights in the LLC can be transferred.58 As mentioned above, LLCs typically receive 
pass-through tax treatment as opposed to double-taxation at both the entity and 
individual level.59 With regard to capitalization, LLCs are generally able to bring in 
new members, as well as vary the entity’s capital structure, by providing within the 
Operating Agreement different rights and privileges of ownership.60
 B. LLCs and General Partnerships
 “LLCs are similar to general partnerships in that most LLC statutes, like the 
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), provide for a default rule of direct management by 
members.”61 Additionally, “[l]ike partnerships, LLCs are noncorporate firms whose 
members commonly participate directly in management and . . . unlike partners, 
LLC members have limited liability and sometimes do not participate directly in 
management unless the agreement provides otherwise.”62 However, the general 
partnership and the LLC differ in a few ways as well. First, LLC members have 
limited liability for the debts of the LLC,63 whereas general partners are liable for the 
debts of the entity.64 Second, as Professor Ribstein states, “LLCs are more conducive 
to centralized management than general partnerships.”65 Many statutes provide for 
55. See 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 2:1 (“The inherent f lexibility in most LLC statutes further 
enhances a firm’s ability to adopt features that best serve its objectives.”).
56. See Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 495.
57. See id. at 497.
58. See id. at 497–98.
59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing tax treatment of LLCs).
60. See Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 495.
61. See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 816; see also 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 4.20 (discussing 
filing requirement, number of owners, execution, purposes and powers, etc.).
62. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 810.
63. See id. at 816; see also 2 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 12:8 (“General partners are liable jointly 
or jointly and severally for debts of the partnership. However, the creditor usually must exhaust remedies 
against the firm, particularly under RUPA [Revised Uniform Partnership Act], which requires 
exhaustion of remedies for all types of debts, whether contract or tort.”).
64. See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 816–17.
65. Id. at 817. See generally supra note 50 (discussing different types of corporate structure).
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the LLC Articles of Organization to determine its management structure, while 
other statutes provide for “corporate-type centralized management.”66 General 
partnerships, through agreement of the partners, provide for managing partners, 
while “LLC statutes go further by providing a formal structure for centralized 
management.”67 As it directly relates to the focus of this note, “this structural 
difference between LLCs and partnerships means that some LLC investors may not 
expect to participate in control to the same extent as general partners”68 and thus 
may rely on the substantial “efforts of others” to derive a return on their investment.
 C. LLCs and Corporations 
 Both LLCs and corporations offer limited liability to their members and 
shareholders, respectively.69 A major difference between corporations and LLCs is 
that corporate law statutes provide for control and management in a board of 
directors.70 In contrast, the default rule in LLC statutes, including RULLCA, is that 
management is by the LLC members themselves unless the LLC Operating 
Agreement provides otherwise.71 Further, LLCs in most instances are subject to 
partnership level taxation instead of corporate taxation,72 which occurs in the case of 
a C Corporation at both the entity and the individual level.73
IV.  YES, NO, AND MAYBE: FEDERAL CASES ADDRESSING WHETHER THE LLC IS A 
SECURITY
 Courts have developed standards to determine whether stock74 or partnership 
interests75????? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ??? ????????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
66. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 817.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 4.19; see also 2 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 12:1 
(“All the LLC statutes explicitly provide that neither the members nor managers of an LLC are liable 
for debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the LLC. Indeed, the ability to combine limited liability 
with partnership features is one of the most important advantages of the LLC.”).
70. See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 819.
71. See Revised Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 407(a)(1) (2006). This section provides, “[a] limited liability 
company is a member-managed limited liability company unless the operating agreement: (1) expressly 
provides that: (A) the company is or will be ‘member-managed’; (B) the company is or will be ‘managed 
by managers’; or (C) management of the company is or will be ‘vested in managers.’” Id.
72. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the tax treatment of LLCs). 
73. See Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 482–83; “[A] C corporation is recognized as a separate taxpaying 
entity. . . . The profit of a corporation is taxed to the corporation when earned, and then is taxed to the 
shareholders when distributed as dividends. This creates a double tax.” Corporations, Business, IRS.gov, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98240,00.html (last updated June 3, 2011).
74. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) discussed infra Part IV.C. 
75. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981) discussed infra Part IV.A.
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LLC membership interests are securities. While LLCs are similar in many ways to 
these other business forms, their ownership interests do not fit neatly in either category 
according to the standards courts have developed for determining whether general 
partnership interests and stock are securities. This Part provides an examination of 
several cases analyzing the issue. Courts deciding the issue begin by applying the 
Howey test to these LLC interests.76 Although the courts’ analytical approaches may 
be similar, the answers they arrive at are not, leading to a lack of predictability.77 And 
because the LLC has emerged as a favored choice of business entity, a consistent 
answer and a guiding framework are necessary to provide business managers and 
business advisors certainty in forming an LLC and issuing LLC interests to investors. 
Part IV.A. reviews SEC enforcement actions in which federal courts were faced with 
the issue of whether an LLC interest was a security. Part IV.B. discusses cases in 
which courts have found that LLC interests were securities. And Part IV.C. reviews 
cases in which courts found that the interest was not a security.
 A. SEC Enforcement Actions
 The SEC has brought a number of enforcement actions alleging violations of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that would require a finding that the LLC interests in those cases constituted 
securities.78 This can be discerned from three of these cases which are discussed 
below.79
 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Vision Communications, Inc.80 represents the 
first case in which the SEC challenged the offer and sale of LLC interests under 
federal securities laws.81 In seeking a judgment against the LLC, the SEC presented 
“an issue of first impression in the federal courts.”82 It was alleged that the defendant, 
76. See discussion infra Part IV.A–C. 
77. 2 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, §14:2 (“The cases on LLC interests are split.”).
78. See, e.g., SEC v. Vision Commc’ns, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC Docket 880, 1994 WL 
96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., Litigation Release No. 
14085, 56 SEC Docket, 1994 WL 186833 (SEC) (May 16, 1994); Press Release, SEC, Comm’n Obtains 
TRO Against Knoxville, LLC, SEC News Dig. 94-130-10, 1994 WL 328317 (July 12, 1994); SEC v. 
Future Vision Direct Mktg., Inc., Litigation Release No. 14384, 58 SEC Docket 1716, 1995 WL 25731 
(SEC) (Jan. 18, 1995); SEC v. Am. Interactive Grp., LLC, Litigation Release No. 14462, 59 SEC 
Docket 203, 1995 WL 229088 (SEC) (Apr. 10, 1995); SEC v. United Commc’ns, Ltd., Litigation 
Release No. 14477, 59 SEC Docket 424, 1995 WL 254714 (SEC) (Apr. 24, 1995); SEC v. Irwin Harry 
Bloch, Litigation Release No. 14511, 59 SEC Docket 931, 1995 WL 317420 (SEC) (May 25, 1995).
79. See Elaine A. Welle, Limited Liability Company Interests as Securities: Planning and Drafting Strategies 
Related to Securities Law Considerations, 31 Land & Water L. Rev. 153, 154–55 (1996) (discussing 
seven lawsuits brought by the SEC “against LLC promoters alleging violations of the federal securities 
laws in connection with the offer or sale of ownership interests in LLCs”).
80. SEC v. Vision Commc’n, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR), 1994 WL 326868 (D.D.C. May 11, 1994); see also 
Vision Commc’n, Litigation Release No. 14026, 1994 WL 96945.
81. See Welle, supra note 45, at 432.
82. Id.
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Vision Communications, raised approximately $1.25 million by selling LLC interests 
to various investors throughout the United States while in the process of developing 
a wireless cable television system.83 The SEC alleged, inter alia, that Vision failed to 
register the LLC interests with the SEC.84 Ultimately, the district court granted the 
SEC’s request for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendants from future 
securities violations.85 The court made no findings as to whether the LLC interests 
were securities.86 However, the court’s issuance of the temporary restraining order 
suggests that, under the facts, the court may have determined that the LLC interests 
were securities.87
 Three years later, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rendered an 
opinion on the question of whether LLC interests were securities. In Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Parkersburg Wireless Limited Liability Company, the court held 
that the interests in Parkersburg Wireless Limited Liability Company (PWLLC) were 
securities.88 PWLLC sold its interests through both mail and telephone solicitations to 
over seven hundred individuals in forty-three states.89 Each member was required to 
purchase at least two units in PWLLC at $5000 per unit, effectively requiring a 
minimum investment of $10,000.90 Management was controlled by a named defendant, 
and only one management issue, the purchase of another wireless cable operation, had 
ever been submitted to the members of PWLLC for discussion.91 The court’s analysis 
began with the Howey test.92 From these facts, the court determined that all four 
elements of the Howey test were satisfied93 because each investor invested money for a 
83. See Vision Commc’n, Litigation Release No. 14026, 1994 WL 96945; Welle, supra note 45, at 433.
84. See Vision Commc’n, Litigation Release No. 14026, 1994 WL 96945; Welle, supra note 45, at 433–34.
85. See Vision Commc’n, Litigation Release No. 14026, 1994 WL 96945; Welle, supra note 45, at 435.
86. See Welle, supra note 45, at 435.
87. See id. 
88. 991 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1997) (“The interests in PWLLC, therefore, assuredly were ‘securities.’”).
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 7–8.
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id. at 8.
93. Id. at 8–9.
They were told that they would receive a pro rata share of the revenues generated from 
the wireless cable operation. This establishes that the members of the LLC shared 
“horizontal commonality,” meaning that the fates of all investors in PWLLC were 
bound together with the profit or the loss of the entire group. Members of the LLC 
also had “vertical commonality” with the fate of the corporation itself, meaning that the 
investors’ success or failure was linked inextricably to the success or failure of the 
corporation. . . .
Finally, PWLLC investors’ hoped-for profits clearly were to be derived from the efforts 
of individuals other than the investors themselves; the investors had little, if any, true 
input into the company.
 Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
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promise of a pro rata share of revenues from the operation, which satisfied the Howey 
“common enterprise” prong because “the fates of all investors . . . were bound together.”94 
In addition, the court determined that the expected profits were to be derived entirely 
through “the efforts of individuals other than the investors themselves” because “the 
investors had little, if any, true input into the company.”95 Thus, the court held that the 
LLC interests were securities.96
 A third case, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Shreveport Wireless Cable TV 
Partnership, involved an analysis of two partnership interests and one LLC interest 
in three wireless cable operators: Reading Partnership, Baton Rouge LLC, and 
Shreveport Partnership.97 Reading Partnership engaged Champion Communications 
Corporation to provide it with construction, system development, interim 
management, and consulting services in exchange for a five percent non-voting 
interest in Reading Partnership.98 Additionally, Champion solicited members of the 
public to invest in Reading Partnership.99 Similarly, Baton Rouge LLC brought in 
B.R. Cable to provide the same services that Champion provided.100 In return for 
providing its services, B.R. Cable was also to receive a five percent non-voting 
interest in Baton Rouge LLC and solicited investments on behalf of Baton Rouge 
LLC.101 Similar to Champion and B.R. Cable, Complete, a Nevada corporation, was 
to provide the same services for the Shreveport System, and also was to receive a five 
percent non-voting interest in Shreveport Partnership.102 In total, over $10 million 
and approximately seven hundred general partnership units were sold in Reading 
Partnership, over $17 million and 1200 limited liability company interests were sold 
to 1489 investors in Baton Rouge LLC, and Shreveport LLC raised over $11 million 
through the sale of 740 general partnership units in Shreveport Partnership to 998 
investors.103
 In response to a motion for summary judgment, the court did not decide whether 
the LLC interests were securities, finding that “a genuine issue of material fact exists 
as to whether the ownership interests in the wireless cable entities . . . are 
94. Id. at 8.
95. Id. For discussion of the Howey test, see George A. Burke, Jr., Limited Liability Companies and the 
Federal Securities Laws: Congress Should Amend the Securities Laws to Avoid Coverage, 76 Ind. L.J. 749, 
752–59 (2001); Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company Membership Interests Should Not Be 
Treated as Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage This Result, 45 Hastings L.J. 1223, 1274–78 (1994); 
Park McGinty, The Limited Liability Company: Opportunity for Selective Securities Law Deregulation, 64 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 369, 385–92 (1996).
96. See Parkersburg Wireless LLC, 991 F. Supp. at 10–11.
97. 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (HHG) ¶ 90, 322, *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 20 1998).
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
1553
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
‘securities.’”104 However, as in Parkersburg, the starting point in the court’s analysis 
was the Howey test.105 The court’s analysis under Howey, and the determination of 
whether these interests constituted securities turned in this case on the fourth prong: 
“whether the investors expected to earn profits from the efforts of others.”106 The 
defendants argued that the investors purchased interests in general partnerships and 
a limited liability company and that, by doing so, “the investors were expected to 
and, in fact, agreed to participate significantly in the management and operation of 
the cable entities in which they invested.”107
 Although the court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed,108 it 
nevertheless delved further into an analysis of whether the interests were securities.109 
To interpret the final Howey elements, the district court looked to the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Williamson v. Tucker, addressing whether general partnership interests 
constituted investment contracts.110 The Fifth Circuit stated that a general 
partnership interest will be considered a security if the SEC is able to “demonstrate 
that, in spite of the partnership form which the investment took, [the investors were] 
so dependent on the promoter or on a third party that [they were] in fact unable to 
exercise meaningful partnership powers.”111
 Thus, the Fifth Circuit recognized that limited circumstances may allow for a 
general partnership interest to constitute a security, focusing on the level of control 
and level of dependence of the “general partner” as an investor on the managerial or 
entrepreneurial efforts of others.112
 Applying Williamson, the district court in Shreveport Wireless concluded that each 
of the investors held “the powers of general partners” but, by choosing not to exercise 
104. Id. at *21.
105. Id. at *11–12. Moreover, for the purposes of the analysis, the court treated the two general partnership 
interests and the LLC interests as the same kind of interest because “the powers granted to the investors” 
are the same. Id. at *13 n.3 (citing Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability Company 
as a Security, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 1105, 1110–12 (1992)).
106. Id. at *12. 
107. Id. at *13.
108. Id. at *21.
109. Id. at *14.
110. See id. (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981)).
111. Williamson, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (emphasis added).
112. See id. Specifically, for a general partnership interest to be a security the SEC must establish that:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the partner or 
venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would a limited partnership; 
or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business 
affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership . . . powers; or (3) 
the partner . . . is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of 
the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or 
otherwise exercise meaningful partnership . . . powers.
 Id. at 424.
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those powers, they did “not make their interests securities.”113 The court noted, 
however, that if “the investor’s profits after the time of sale are primarily dependent 
upon the promoter’s efforts, the investor should have the protection of the federal 
securities laws.”114 This line of reasoning ref lects an adherence to Howey and the 
principle that the economic reality, i.e., the substance and not the form of the 
transaction, dictates whether or not an LLC interest is deemed a security.115
 B. The LLC Membership Interest is a Security
 In the Northern District of Illinois case Shirley v. JED Capital LLC, a member of 
JED Capital, LLC, an investment company, brought an action against his former 
employer alleging, inter alia, a violation of the federal securities laws.116 While 
working at other investment companies, Plaintiff developed many programs that 
allowed for “automated securities trading, including a Liquidity Replenishment 
Program (‘LRP’).”117 This LRP produced large profits for JED Capital.118 As a result 
of this profitability, JED asked Plaintiff to become an equity owner by becoming a 
member of JED Capital LLC.119 However, Plaintiff alleged that he was promised his 
equity stake would be used to support the further development of LRP and that JED 
Capital had failed to disclose to him “that JED could not pay its bills and had no 
revenues except those brought in by [Plaintiff].”120 Finally, Plaintiff alleged that if he 
did not invest and become a member of JED, “JED would fire him and continue to 
use LRP without him.”121 Subsequently, Plaintiff became a member, having been 
issued membership interests in the LLC, but he did not have any control over the 
direction and decisions of the LLC.122 A little over a year later, Plaintiff was 
113. SEC v. Shreveport Wireless Cable Television P’ship, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (HHG) ¶ 90, 322, *20 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 21, 1996) (citing Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240–41 
(4th Cir. 1988)).
114. Id. (citing SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 547 (D.C.C. 1996)).
115. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851–52 (1975) (“In considering these claims we 
?????? ??????????????????????????????economic realities???????????????????????????????????????????????
may have been employed by the parties.” (emphasis added)).
116. 724 F. Supp. 2d 904, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See id. (“In July 2007, John Harada (‘Harada’), JED’S manager, persuaded [Plaintiff] to convert 
$200,000 owed to him by JED, plus up to $100,000 in future earnings, into equity in JED, making 
Shirley a 10% owner-member of the LLC.”).
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id.
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“persuaded” to invest additional capital into JED.123 In 2009, Plaintiff had agreed 
with another manager of JED to wind up JED and close the LRP program.124
 The court found that “the crux of this debate is whether Plaintiff ’s investments 
in JED constitute[d] an ‘investment contract.’”125 Once again, the doctrinal starting 
point for the court was Howey’s investment contract analysis.126 The final element of 
Howey, the expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others, was the 
only contested issue127 and, as the court stated, “[w]hether an LLC interest is a 
security depends on the particular facts of the investment arrangement and is a 
question that courts must determine on a case-by-case basis after taking into account 
the particular facts and circumstances of the investment arrangement.”128
 In determining that the LLC interests held by Plaintiff were an “investment 
contract” and thus a security,129 the court noted that although Plaintiff was responsible 
for the day-to-day operations of the LRP (the most profitable business of JED), he still 
remained a passive investor in the LLC because he was considered merely as an 
employee (although an equity-member) in a manager-managed LLC, and effectively 
“had no voice in controlling the LLC as a whole.”130
 C. The LLC Membership Interest Is Not a Security
 Keith v. Black Diamond Advisors, Inc. provided the Southern District of New York 
its first opportunity to address the issue.131 Plaintiff, along with other investors, 
formed “a sub-prime mortgage lender.”132 After becoming profitable, Plaintiff was 
123. Id. at 908–09.
In September 2008, Harada persuaded [Plaintiff] to invest an additional $250,000 into 
JED in order to expand the LRP trade to London, making [Plaintiff] a 20% member. 
[Plaintiff] made the investment on the specific agreement that the money would be 
used solely to expand the company’s trading capabilities on the London stock exchange. 
[Plaintiff] alleges that Harada failed to tell him that JED was in the process of repaying 
an investment whereby it would become insolvent, that JED could not pay its bills, that 
Harada had “sucked” money out of JED to finance other ventures, and that JED 
needed [Plaintiff ’s] money for its daily survival. After [Plaintiff] made the additional 
investment, Harada allegedly failed to expand the company into the London market. 
[Plaintiff] alleges that this failure cost him and JED $3,000 daily in lost profits.
 Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 910.
126. Id. 
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Cogniplex, Inc. v. Ross, No. 00 C 7463, 00 C 7933, 2001 WL 436210, *10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 
2001)). 
129. Id. at 911.
130. Id.
131. 48 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
132. Id. at 328.
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approached by Black Diamond, a venture capital firm, to form Pace, a New York-
based LLC.133 The LLC Operating Agreement created a member-managed LLC in 
which the members holding interests in the LLC actually managed the entity.134 
Plaintiff alleged violations under federal securities law, namely, that Black Diamond 
used its majority position “to squeeze him out” of control, bringing a Rule 10b–5 
action concerning the purchase and sale of his interest in Pace.135
 Like the analysis contained in the decisions discussed above, the court began 
with the Howey analysis.136 The court determined that the Plaintiff met the first 
three Howey ???????????? ???? ???????? ??????????????????? ????? ???? ??????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????137 Plaintiff argued 
that although the LLC Operating Agreement and the New York LLC statute138 
provided him with the ability to manage Pace, the economic reality was that he had 
minimal involvement with Pace as a result of Black Diamond attempting to “squeeze 
him out.”139
 In order to determine the degree of control under the fourth prong, the court 
looked to the Fifth Circuit’s general partnership analysis in Williamson, making an 
analogy between general partnership interests and LLC membership interests to 
determine whether or not Plaintiff was “so dependent” on the efforts of others.140 In 
addition, the court, relying on the Fourth Circuit in Rivanna Trawlers, noted that the 
critical inquiry was “whether the powers possessed by the [LLC members] under the 
[Operating Agreement] were so significant that, regardless of the degree to which such 
133. Id.
134. See id. at 332–33 (discussing the rights granted Plaintiff under the New York LLC statute).
135. Id. at 327–28.
136. See id. at 332 (“LLC membership interests are not ‘securities’ unless they meet the four criteria of an 
‘investment contract.’”).
137. Id. at 332. The court determined that Plaintiff satisfied the first three elements of Howey through the 
allegations of his complaint and determined that “[t]he critical inquiry here involves the fourth prong of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
entrepreneurial efforts of others.” Id. 
138. N.Y. Ltd. Liab. Co. Law § 401 (2011).
139. Keith, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 328, 333 (“On the basis of these allegations, Keith argues that his investment in 
Pace resulted in so little control, notwithstanding the statute and the Agreement, that he deserves to be 
protected by the securities laws.”).
140. Id. at 333–34.
In Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981), the court recognized that 
although general partnership interests, in contrast to limited partnership interests, are 
ordinarily not securities because of the level of managerial control exercised by a general 
partner, in some limited circumstances a general partnership interest may be a 
“security.” By analogy, an LLC membership interests may be considered a security if 
the Plaintiff can “demonstrate that, in spite of the partnership form which the 
investment took, [the investor was] so dependent on the promoter or on a third party 
that [he was] in fact unable to exercise meaningful partnership powers.”
 Id.
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powers were exercised, the investments could not have been premised on a reasonable 
expectation of profits to be derived from the management efforts of others.”141
 The court concluded that Plaintiff intended to be an active investor in the 
business when he made his investment.142 And although his actual level of control 
“was less than [Plaintiff] expected to exercise,” the court found that the failure to 
meet that expectation did not convert the interests Plaintiff purchased into a security 
and afford Plaintiff the protections offered by the federal securities laws.143 Thus, the 
court’s analysis confirms that the relevant inquiry into and determination of the 
investor’s “degree of control” must be an analysis of the investor’s “expectation” and 
not the amount of control actually exercised.144
 In Great Lakes Chemical Corp. v. Monsanto Co., the issue of whether LLC interests 
constitute securities arose in the context of a sale of a business.145 Great Lakes 
purchased NSC Technologies Company, a Delaware LLC, from Monsanto and 
STI.146 Great Lakes alleged violations of section 10(b) for a failure “to disclose 
material information in conjunction with the sale of NSC.”147 Great Lakes argued 
that “NSC was the functional equivalent of a corporation, and therefore the interests 
141. Id. at 334 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Furthermore, 
‘the mere choice by a partner to remain passive is not sufficient to create a security interest.’” (quoting 
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 241 (4th Cir. 1988))).
142. Id.
143. Id. (“[I]f at the time of his investment in Pace, Keith did not intend to be a passive investor, as he clearly 
did not, the Pace interests could not be securities. Furthermore, although the degree of control he 
actually exercised was less than he expected to exercise, that fact does not convert his interests into 
securities.”). Nelson v. Stahl provided the Southern District of New York a second opportunity to revisit 
the question of whether LLC interests are securities. See generally 173 F. Supp. 2d 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
However, the result turned out the same and the court found that the LLC interests were not securities. 
Similarly to Keith, the court began by looking to Howey’s investment contract analysis for guidance. See 
id. at 163–64. Also, like Keith, the issue that arose was with respect to the fourth prong of Howey?
whether profits were to be derived through the efforts of others. See id. at 165. The court stated that “[a]
n LLC membership interest can be considered a security ‘when the partners are so dependent on a 
particular manager that they cannot replace him or otherwise exercise ultimate control.’” Id. (citing 
Williamson 645 F.2d 404). Further, “[t]he delegation of rights and duties standing alone does not give 
rise to the sort of dependence on others which underlies the [fourth] prong of the Howey test.” Id. (first 
alteration in original). In analyzing the level of control, the court wrote, “[s]o long as the member retains 
ultimate control, he has the power over the investment and the access to information about it which is 
necessary to protect against any unwilling dependence on the manager.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). In concluding its discussion of the control prong, the court stated, “the mere choice by a 
[member] to remain passive is not sufficient to create a security interest.” Id. (citation omitted). The 
court concluded that the LLC interests were not securities because plaintiffs owned sixty percent of the 
membership interests, the LLC Operating Agreement provided for membership management, and the 
terms of the LLC Agreements implied “that plaintiffs did not intend to be passive investors.” Id. at 166.
144. See Keith, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
145. 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 377 (D. Del. 2000).
146. Id.
147. Id. 
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should be treated as stock.”148 To bolster this argument, Great Lakes asserted that 
the LLC Agreement describes the LLC interests as “equity securities” and thus the 
functional equivalent of stock.149 Unlike the aforementioned decisions, the district 
court first looked to the Supreme Court’s decisions in United Housing Foundation, 
Inc. v. Forman and Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, where the Court articulated the 
test that would govern stock or “equity securities,” which are the ownership unit of 
corporations.150 However, the district court noted that the Court in Landreth 
expressly limited its test to transactions involving “traditional stock.”151 Thus Landreth 
was ultimately inapplicable to an analysis of LLC interests.152 The court reasoned 
that “the LLC Interests, although they are ‘stock-like’ in nature, are not traditional 
stock. Landreth, thus, is inapplicable to this case, and the court must determine 
whether the sale of NSC was essentially an investment transaction.”153
 After rejecting Great Lakes’s argument that the LLC interests should be analyzed 
as stock under Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, the court applied the Howey test. 
The court determined that LLC interests failed to satisfy the Howey test on two 
prongs: common enterprise (the second prong) and expectation of profits to be 
derived from the efforts of others (the fourth prong).154 With respect to the common 
enterprise prong, the court found that (1) there was no horizontal commonality 
because the challenged transaction was the outright purchase of NSC by Great Lakes 
and its contributions were not pooled with those of other investors; and (2) there was 
no vertical commonality because “the fortunes of Great Lakes were [not] linked” 
with those of Monsanto Corp. or STI.155 With respect to the fourth prong, 
expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others, the court looked to, 
inter alia, Williamson v. Tucker’s analysis of general partnership interests.156 The court 
determined that, although the LLC agreement provided that members have no 
direct authority to manage NSC, Great Lakes had “the power to directly affect the 
profits it received from NSC” because Great Lakes had purchased all of the interests 
in NSC and therefore had the ability to remove management without cause.157 As a 
148. Id. at 387.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 387. (“[T]he five most common characteristics of stock [are] (1) the right to receive dividends 
contingent upon an apportionment of profit; (2) negotiability; (3) the ability to be pledged or 
hypothecated; (4) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and (5) 
the capacity to appreciate in value.” (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 
(1985))).
151. Id. at 385–86, 389.
152. Id. (citing Landreth Timber Co., 471 U.S. at 694).
153. Id. at 389.
154. Id. at 389–92.
155. Id. at 390.
156. See id. at 391–92.
157. Id.
1559
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
result, the court found that the members “profits . . . did not come solely from the 
efforts of others” and thus also failed the fourth prong of the Howey test.158
 The court continued its analysis by looking to one of the general terms found in 
section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act: “any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
security . . . .”159 But the court determined that the Howey test “embodies the essential 
attributes that run through all of the Court’s decisions defining a security.”160 
Consequently, the court concluded that, although the LLC was the functional 
equivalent of a corporation and the LLC Agreement described the membership 
interests as “equity securities,” the interests were “neither ‘stock,’ nor an ‘investment 
contract,’ nor ‘an instrument commonly known as a security.’”161
 Robinson v. Glynn represents the first time a federal circuit court of appeals 
reviewed the issue of whether LLC interests are securities.162 Plaintiff, an executive 
within GeoPhone Company, LLC, alleged federal securities fraud in connection 
with the purchase and sale of a partial LLC interest he had purchased in GeoPhone.163 
Plaintiff argued that his LLC interest constituted either stock or an investment 
contract under the definition of security in section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act.164 The 
district court determined that the partial membership interest was not a security, and 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that “Robinson was an active and 
knowledgeable executive” as opposed to a casual, “passive investor.”165 The court 
further stated that it did not find it appropriate to “unjustifiably expand the scope of 
the federal securities laws by treating an ordinary commercial venture as an 
investment contract.”166
 In reaching this conclusion, as in the cases discussed above, Howey was the 
doctrinal starting point167 and the disputed element concerned whether Robinson 
expected profits to be derived solely from the efforts of others.168 The court 
determined that because Robinson served as GeoPhone’s Treasurer, holding powers 
pursuant to the LLC Operating Agreement, and acted as a member of the board of 
managers, the final Howey prong requiring an expectation of profits derived from 
the efforts of others could not be met, and thus the partial membership interest was 
158. Id. (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 393. (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. See id. (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)); see also Forman, 421 
U.S. at 852 (“We perceive no distinction, for present purposes, between an ‘investment contract’ and an 
‘instrument commonly known as a security.’”).
161. Id. at 394.
162. 349 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2003).
163. Id. at 168.
164. Id. at 170.
165. Id. at 168.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 170.
168. Id.
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not a security.169 Further, for reasons similar to those articulated by the Great Lakes 
court, the court in Robinson determined that the partial membership interest was not 
defined as traditional stock nor did it bear stock’s usual characteristics.170 The court 
specifically stated that it was only deciding the narrow issue of whether Robinson’s 
partial membership interest in GeoPhone, LLC was a security and not the broader 
issue of whether LLC interests are securities under section 2(a)(1). Despite both 
parties’ invitations that the court do so, the court declared that
[p]recisely because  LLCs lack standardized membership rights or 
organizational structures, they can assume an almost unlimited variety of 
forms. It becomes, then, exceedingly difficult to declare that LLCs, whatever 
their form, either possess or lack the economic characteristics associated with 
investment contracts. . . . We decline, therefore, the parties’ invitation for a 
broader holding.171
As such, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the circumstances will dictate whether 
or not an LLC membership interest is a security.
 D. Does Howey Fall Short?
 As the cases indicate above, although the courts employ a similar analysis, the 
decisions rendered do not provide a definitive answer as to whether LLC interests 
are securities.172? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
can be made about the existing analytical framework for determining whether LLC 
interests are securities under the 1933 Act. First, the analysis is fact-specific to the 
individual LLC interest, governed by the “economic realities” of the transaction;173 
second, the Supreme Court’s investment contract analysis in Howey is the doctrinal 
169. Id. at 170–72.
170. Id. at 173–74 (“Thus the securities laws apply when an instrument is both called stock and bears stock’s 
usual characteristics. Yet Robinson’s membership interest was neither denominated stock by the parties, 
nor did it possess all the usual characteristics of stock.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
171. Id. at 174–75 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Second Circuit has recently followed suit in 
setting up the framework for an analysis of whether an LLC interest is a security in United States v. 
Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2008). Although this case rose on appeal as a challenge to criminal 
sentencing for violation of the federal securities laws, the Second Circuit utilized the same approach as 
in the cases above. The court began with the Howey investment contract analysis and used the Williamson 
partnership analysis as a guidepost in discussing the fourth prong of Howey. See Leonard, 529 F.3d at 
87–91. While the court itself did not determine whether the LLC interests were securities, the court 
concluded “that the jury could have determined that, notwithstanding the organizational documents 
drafted to suggest active participation by members, the defendants sought and expected passive 
investors . . . and therefore the interests that they marketed constituted securities.” Id. at 91.
172. See Coffee & Sale, supra note 18, at 309. (“Absent an authoritative appellate decision, division in the 
case law seems likely to persist on this issue.”). Although two appellate decisions have been rendered, 
There still is no clear answer even with a judicial framework for analysis appearing to have been 
established in the case law. See discussion supra Part IV.B–C.
173. See, e.g., Keith v. Black Diamond Advisors, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 326, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Great Lakes 
Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 384–85 (D. Del. 2000).
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starting point;174 third, so long as Howey is the doctrinal starting point, the final 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????175 and, fourth, so long as 
the final element of Howey is in dispute, the Willamson general partnership analysis 
will likely serve as a useful guidepost for courts analyzing this final element.
 These generalizations, reveal that the only clear answer to whether LLC interests 
are securities under federal securities laws is that there is none. The answer to this 
question is determined on a case-by-case basis. Since the limited liability company 
has become an increasingly popular form in which to do business over the last two 
decades,176 particularly because of the f lexibility it offers, an answer is needed.177 
Lawyers and businesspeople alike, using the LLC as a means to structure their 
business face substantial uncertainties and risks due to the unsettled question of 
whether LLC membership interests are securities. As a result, the following 
discussion introduces other potential solutions that have addressed this issue, 
including this note’s proposal of a Reg. LLC.
V. EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR A SOLUTION 
 Commentators and scholars alike have posited many proposals to determine 
whether LLC membership interests are securities covered by the federal securities 
laws. Three such approaches include (1) a private ordering approach in which the 
parties decide for themselves by contract, (2) a legislative opt-out approach, and (3) a 
Congressional amendment to the definition of “security” in section 2(a)(1).178 Each of 
these proposals is briefly outlined and evaluated below.
 Professor Ribstein argues for a private-ordering approach, which would allow 
“the parties themselves [to] determine whether the securities laws apply.”179 The 
174. While courts do recognize the similarities between LLCs, partnerships, and corporations, Howey is the 
doctrinal starting point for determining whether LLC interests are securities. See, e.g., Great Lakes 
Chem. Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376 (refusing to apply the Landreth stock analysis to LLC interests, although 
the LLC interests bore the label “stock”).
175. See, e.g., Robinson, 349 F.3d 166; Keith, 48 F. Supp. 2d 326; Shirley v. JED Capital, LLC, 724 F. Supp. 
2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 2010); see also Burke, supra note 95, at 758. 
176. See David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts 
and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for 
the Limited Liability Company?, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 427, 448 (1998).
177. See 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 2:1 (“The inherent f lexibility in most LLC statutes .  .  . 
enhances a firm’s ability to adopt features that best serve its objectives.”).
178. See Burke, supra note 95, at 767 (“If the theory of the intermediate-private-ordering approach is 
implemented using the legislative method of the opt-out approach, the result is a practical solution to 
the problems of LLC interests as securities.”).
179. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 810, 812 (“LLC interests, like partnership interests, should be at least strongly 
presumed not to be ‘securities.’ This conclusion is based on an analysis of the extent to which courts 
should rely on investment form rather than substance . . . in defining a security.”). Professor Ribstein 
further states, “The courts also could apply what might be called an ‘intermediate private ordering’ 
approach. Under this approach, the courts could hold that the securities laws do not apply when 
investors were led by the form of the transaction not to expect protection.” Id. at 812.
1562
REGULATION LLC
rationale underpinning this approach stems from Professor Ribstein’s contention that 
“contracting parties ordinarily are better suited than courts or regulators to determine 
the amount of disclosure that is appropriate in specific contexts.”180 In advancing this 
argument, Professor Ribstein reasons that “the form of the transaction reduces the 
costs of complying with and adjudicating disputes under the securities laws. . . . By 
facilitating contracting over disclosure rights, emphasizing the form of the transaction 
tends to produce an optimal amount of disclosure.”181
 As an alternative, Professor McGinty advocates an opt-out approach and argues 
that “Congress could add [to the definition of security in the Securities Acts] the 
following phrase: ‘interests in limited liability companies other than excluded LLC 
interests.’”182 Under this approach, the definition of security would read as it presently 
does in section 2(a)(1), but simply with this additional language. According to McGinty, 
the term “excluded LLC interests” would allow LLCs who issue such interests, in a 
fashion similar to Professor Ribstein’s private ordering approach, to choose “to exclude 
themselves from [securities law] coverage on the condition that they disclose [to 
prospective investors] that interests therein are not covered or protected by federal or 
state securities laws.”183 Professor McGinty argues that by allowing LLCs to opt-out 
from securities law coverage, business and transaction costs would be substantially 
reduced, making the formation of an LLC a more cost-effective venture.184
 A third solution calls for Congress to amend the definition of “security” in both 
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act to “definitively exclude LLC interests.”185 More 
specifically, this proposed solution would include in the definition of security a 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 824.
182. McGinty, supra note 95, at 437.
LLCs should be able to opt in or out of the federal securities laws, provided that those 
that opt out clearly notify prospective investors (i) that no protections of federal securities 
laws cover such interests and (ii) what kind of disclosure they are making. Giving clear 
notice to investors, this regime would allow both LLCs and investors to reach a more 
voluntary equilibrium over how much disclosure and securities regulation they wanted.
 Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 426, 437.
Compliance with securities laws creates costs, some of which intuitively seem 
worthwhile and others of which seem to have few offsetting benefits. Prohibitions 
against fraud, which are the securities laws’ most legitimate function, sometimes create 
legal risks that force firms into costly compliance with securities regulation, even when 
they eventually would be held not covered by the securities laws.
 Id.
185. See Burke, supra note 95, at 767 (“If the theory of the intermediate-private-ordering approach is 
implemented using the legislative method of the opt-out approach, the result is a practical solution to 
the problems of LLC interests as securities.”).
1563
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 56 | 2011/12
statement that “interests in limited liability companies are not securities within the 
definition of this act and are therefore not protected by the provision of this act.”186
 Collectively, these approaches do not allow for the possibility that in some 
instances LLC interests should be deemed securities and should therefore afford LLC 
members the protections of federal securities laws under their registration, disclosure, 
and anti-fraud provisions. It is not a choice that should be wholly subject to private-
ordering because private ordering presumes equal footing in negotiations between the 
parties, which in some instances may leave the possibility for fraud in negotiations 
between entity managers and potential members of the LLC.187 Furthermore, private 
ordering and the legislative opt-out have the potential to provide for different levels of 
protection of LLC membership interests within the same LLC, where some members 
may hold interests that are securities and are therefore subject to federal securities law 
and others holding a different class of interests do not.188 Also, definitively excluding 
LLC interests from the definition of security provides an inadequate solution because, 
as the cases above indicate, some LLC interests do have the characteristics of a 
security and therefore should be subject to the federal securities laws. While excluding 
LLC interests from securities law coverage provides a definitive answer, it is over-
inclusive because it expressly excludes all LLC membership interests, an approach 
contrary to the federal court analysis above. Accordingly, a categorical rule that the 
1933 Act and 1934 Act will not protect investors in any LLC is inadequate because it 
does not afford the protections of the federal securities laws to LLC members that the 
securities laws were intended to protect.
VI. REGULATION LLC
 The solution proposed here, Reg. LLC, is the promulgation of a regulatory safe 
harbor by the SEC. It is envisaged that Reg. LLC would afford LLC managers, who 
in good faith have structured an LLC, a safe harbor with an option not to register 
the membership interests. This would serve as the alternative to the current 
unpredictable jurisprudence that at times imposes liability for violations of the federal 
securities laws with respect to the purchase or sale of LLC membership interests.189 
As the cases indicate above, this note takes the position that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to declare all LLC interests presumptively are or presumptively are not 
securities. This note principally argues that although Howey’s investment contract 
analysis has guided courts faced with this question, the investment contract analysis 
has resulted in inconsistent results, leaving business managers and lawyers who have 
formed LLCs to the mercy of judicial interpretation. The inherent risk and 
186. Id. 
187. See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Federal Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities Regulation 
by Private Agreement, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 519, 540 (1999) (“If . . . the purpose of securities regulation 
is to serve a more publicly-directed purpose, such as increasing public confidence in capital markets, 
deterring fraud, or protecting investors, then the reform measures would be improvident.”). 
188. For additional criticism of Professor Ribstein and Professor McGinty’s approaches, see id. at 528–32.
189. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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uncertainty faced by businesspeople and lawyers can be simply addressed by the SEC 
developing Reg. LLC, a safe harbor for membership interests for this popular and 
fast-growing business form.
 Specifically, this note proposes that the choice of whether an LLC interest is a 
security should be made by the LLC’s managers at the outset of the LLC’s formation, 
so that it can be part of the calculus of what business form the entity takes and what 
registration and disclosure obligations the entity wishes to take on. However, this 
choice should be grounded in a regulatory safe harbor that sets forth certain 
conditions relating to the characteristics of the given LLC interest that, if met, would 
not bring the LLC interest within the definition of a security. This would allow 
businesspeople and lawyers both f lexibility and predictability as they decide how to 
establish the capital and governance structures of their businesses and whether the 
LLC is the right business form for their purposes. Accordingly, this note proposes a 
regulatory safe harbor, Reg. LLC, as a pragmatic solution because the safe harbor 
would include conditions that, if satisfied, would mean a particular LLC interest is 
not a security under section 2(a)(1) and not subject to registration and disclosure 
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
 In structuring Reg. LLC, it is important to consider two perhaps competing 
interests: first, the underlying policy of the federal securities laws, namely, investor 
protection through disclosure and anti-fraud measures,190 and second, the f lexibility 
offered by the LLC business form.191 Reg. LLC strikes this balance by preserving 
the choice and flexibility offered prospective business managers by the LLC statutes, 
while at the same time affording investor protection. Additionally, the proposed 
framework for the conditions of Reg. LLC draws on the case law previously discussed 
and incorporates the factors that courts found dispositive on the issue of whether 
LLC membership interests constitute securities.
 In analyzing the relevant federal case law, this note has extracted four general 
principles from the decisions of federal courts that have attempted to answer whether 
LLC interests are securities: (1) a case-by-case determination is necessary as the courts 
use a fact specific analysis; (2) if the Howey test is satisfied, LLC interests will be 
deemed securities; (3) the fourth prong of Howey, the expectation of profits to be 
derived from the efforts of others, will typically in dispute; and (4) when the fourth 
prong of Howey is in dispute, the Fifth Circuit’s Williamson general partnership analysis 
will likely serve as a guidepost for courts’ interpretations. Specifically, the second, 
third, and fourth principles should serve as the basis for the Reg. LLC safe harbor 
setting forth the conditions under which an LLC membership interest would not be 
deemed a security allowing, as the Supreme Court in Howey articulated, “a flexible 
rather than a static principle.”192 It would logically follow that this can be used to form 
the foundation of a regulatory safe harbor for the LLC as well.
190. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
191. See 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 6, § 2:1 (“The inherent f lexibility in most LLC statutes  .  .  . 
enhances a firm’s ability to adopt features that best serve its objectives.”).
192. 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
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 As can be observed from the discussion of the relevant case law, the underlying 
principles of Howey are essentially dispositive to the analysis. Simply, if an LLC 
membership interest is offered for sale and is made within a “common enterprise,” 
i.e., satisfies “horizontal commonality,” with an expectation of profit to be derived 
principally through the efforts of others, the interests will then in all likelihood be 
considered a security under the federal securities laws. This appears to be the case in 
most manager-managed LLCs because the member-investor is in most instances 
solely relying on the manager(s) of the LLC to turn a profit of his investment.
 However, the close case is that of a member-managed LLC, where the member 
either does not exercise the level of control that he is expected to exercise or that the 
LLC Operating Agreement provides that he exercise. This is the most important factor 
that will contribute to forming Reg. LLC, the fourth prong of Howey, and an analysis 
into the expectation of control of the LLC member-investor-manager. This expectation 
can be determined by review of the disclosure materials provided the member-investor-
manager, the LLC Operating Agreement, and discussions surrounding the role the 
LLC member is expected to take because as the cases indicate, the level of control 
actually exercised or even the level of control expected to be exercised, will in all 
likelihood determine whether an LLC membership interest is a security. By reviewing 
these materials at the time of formation, the expectations of a member’s involvement 
and level of control in the profitability of the LLC, lawyers and businesspeople will be 
able to decipher whether an LLC membership interest is a security.
 Thus, under Reg. LLC, an LLC membership would not be deemed a security if 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
each member through the Operating Agreement and adequate disclosures provided 
to members about the role each member was to take and the level of managerial 
control, if any, each member was to assume.
VII. CONCLUSION
 While this note has taken the position that the specific facts and circumstances of 
any particular LLC interest should dictate whether it is a security, the answer to this 
question should not be left to the unpredictability of the judicial process, which can 
open up the LLC, its managers, and its members to potential securities law liability in 
connection with the purchase or sale of LLC membership interests. In the alternative, 
using the federal courts’ application of Howey and Williamson to LLC membership 
interests as a basis for development, Reg. LLC would provide businesspeople and 
lawyers alike flexibility and predictability as they decide how to establish the capital 
and governance structures of their businesses and determine whether the LLC is the 
right business form for their purposes. This will allow promoters and managers the 
option to choose another corporate form to better meet their needs. However, if an 
LLC is the best form of entity for the respective business, the LLC promoters and 
managers may still opt to create LLC membership interests that, not satisfying the 
conditions of the safe harbor, are securities pursuant to Reg. LLC and therefore subject 
to registration and disclosure under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
